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Abstract. It is often argued whether public good decisions
withahighdegreeofuncertainty, suchaspublicdecisionsfor
the prevention against natural hazards are, should be solely
left to be taken by expert bodies. Imperfect knowledge of
experts may leave an uncertain level of risk to the public or
the affected groups of persons or expert decisions might not
reﬂect the affected parties’ preferences in whose interest they
should ideally act. Direct participation of affected parties in
such decisions is believed to be valuable in many ways. On
the one hand, it allows ﬁnal decision makers’ choices to be
more accepted among stakeholders and on the other hand,
knowledge by the experts can be complemented with the one
by affected parties. From a political economic viewpoint it
will be discussed in the present paper whether this process
can be viewed to provide a “better” decision-making process
by looking at an exemplary case of danger zone planning in
Austria.
1 Introduction
The management of natural hazards poses numerous chal-
lenges to decision makers in developing as well as developed
countries. Naturally, states’ resources are restricted, thus a
full protection cannot be achieved since opportunity costs of
a zero-risk level would be too high, therefore the allocation
of all funds towards this aim inefﬁcient. Avoiding catastro-
phes by settling in non hazardous areas also implies in most
of the cases considerable opportunity costs: in less devel-
oped areas people are dependent on settling close to e.g. wa-
ter catchment areas since they cannot afford other infrastruc-
ture arrangements. In more developed countries, settling ar-
eas become more and more scarce, thus ﬂed, at least within
the region, is no option. The questions that arise in the later
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case are: what protection level do we want to achieve? What
remaining risk do we accept? How do we allocate our bud-
gets? Above all, the question is: who is to decide on these
issues?
Certainly, experts are most suitable to tell us, from a tech-
nical viewpoint, what types of measures are needed to sup-
port a certain risk level. On the other hand, only occa-
sionally do technical experts decide about where to install
these measures ﬁrst. Usually, politicians or bureaucratic
units take over these public good decisions. Some protective
measures can be partly characterised as public goods since
e.g.largedamsagainstﬂoodingincitylandscapesarecharac-
terised by the non-exclusivity and non-rivalry principle (Frey
and Kirchg¨ assner, 2002), therefore the market mechanism
would cause an undersupply potentially increasing the con-
sequences of a natural catastrophe. Problems arise if public
good decisions are not in line with the preferences of the af-
fected parties: in spring 2006 D¨ urnkrut (a village in Lower
Austria) was severely destroyed by a coincidence of heavy
rain falls and an intensive thawing period. According to a
newspaper article (Proﬁl, 2006), decision makers were aware
of the fact that protective measures in this village stem from
the early 1940’s that could not hold a ﬂood event of this size.
The outrage among the population was huge when this fact
became public. In economic terms, these issues are usually
referred to as principal-agent problems, whereby the voters
or affected parties can be seen as principals and politicians
as agents who have to serve in the interest of their voters.
The decision makers in the above case argued that they
tried to install new protection measures already in 1997 but
could not succeed because current property owners, who
were mostly farmers, did not agree to re-allocate their farm
lands (they were offered new areas and/or a compensation
for losses in case of a ﬂood event). In order to avoid such
catastrophes and negative consequences of decisions for pro-
tection ahead of it, it is often argued that some sort of conﬂict
resolution is needed. In the literature it is argued that direct
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public participation can resolve especially conﬂicts around
the environment (De Marchi and Ravetz, 2001; Bloomﬁeld
et al., 2001; Beierle and Konisky, 2001; Renn et al., 1995;
Messner et al., 2006). In political economic terms, it is
a way to directly reﬂect people’s preferences in a decision
process through which more consensual solutions might be
found (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Frey and Kirchg¨ assner,
1993) and if not, voting can still be put in place whereby the
outcome, it is argued, still reﬂects a more acceptable solu-
tion compared to not having discussed the issue at the outset
(Bohman and Rehg, 1997). In the end, it provides decision
makers with better understanding of the preferences. These
are at ﬁrst taken into account of bureaucratic experts’ con-
siderations. Following this though is ultimately of beneﬁt
for politicians as well. They are also made liable for wrong
decisions about the allocation of public funds, so participa-
tion could help increase chances to stay in ofﬁce for the next
electoral period.
Advantages of public participation have been recognised
in many areas of public decision-making in Europe, espe-
cially for the environment and is mentioned in many national
laws as well EU core documents (e.g. DETR, 1998; Euro-
pean Commission, 1998). Participation in this context is not
solely deﬁned as in voting, e.g. in public referenda, but es-
pecially in other forms, like e.g. bringing in appeals, initia-
tives, discourse elements etc. In that sense, the deﬁnition by
Renn et al. (1995) can be followed who deﬁne participation
as “forums for exchange that are organised for the purpose
of facilitating communication between government, citizens,
stakeholders and interest groups, and businesses regarding a
speciﬁc decision or problem” (p. 2).
In Austria, public participation has a long tradition in spa-
tial planning, of which hazard zone planning for the preven-
tionagainstrisksfromnaturalhazardsformsapart. Thiscase
is especially interesting because technical experts (which
will be referred to as bureaucrats in this paper since their
ofﬁces show the characteristics of agencies, being budgetary
dependent on politicians’ decisions and having a mission to
provide public goods “protection measures”) are the ones
who draft and decide (in a commission with other decision
makers) upon hazard zone maps, but still integrate elements
of public participation in the decision process.
The present paper attempts at understanding the reasons
for bureaucrats to actually incorporate participatory elements
in their decisions even though they are neither obliged to do
so nor can be sanctioned in case they ignore such elements.
Political economic and related literature will be reviewed to
propose an understanding of why participation could make
decisions on the prevention of natural hazards more efﬁcient.
It is necessary to increase the scientiﬁcally profound recom-
mendations for the legitimacy of public participation in order
to make it become part of the general democratic framework
– something which has been striven for in this stream of re-
search for some time. This goal is increasingly becoming
realistic since voters in many democratic countries realise
that representation in parliaments should not be the only way
for integrating people’s preferences after all. Bloomﬁeld et
al. (2001) draw out that policy makers are not regarded as
the only source for complex social and environmental prob-
lems; Spash (2001) points at environmental political parties
not having sufﬁcient inﬂuence and according to Bohman and
Rehg (1997) people feel more misaligned with governments’
decisions.
The analysis of the behaviour of bureaucrats as experts is
most important since they are the ones who have a crucial in-
ﬂuence on the effect of participation. The incentive-structure
of them can offer an insight in the understanding of the form
of participation and its possible inﬂuence on decision pro-
cesses. Therefore, the economic assumptions of principal-
agent problems build the basis of analysis in this paper, es-
pecially in relation to other decision variables, such as direct
participation from the affected parties.
The paper is structured as follows: An overview of eco-
nomic models of bureaucracy will form the basis for the eval-
uation of public participation in low-probability-high-loss
events. This is followed by looking at an exemplary case
of such a risk, namely hazard zone planning against natu-
ral hazard events in Austria, in order to understand the theo-
retical implications for the incentives of the relevant parties
to incorporate public participation into the decision process.
By asking how the propositions from experts and lay people
could actually deviate from one another, conclusions will be
drawn on how theoretical foundations so far can support the
successful implementation of such processes in practice.
2 Bureaucrats versus the public – theoretical assump-
tions
2.1 Economic models of bureaucracy
As already mentioned a state’s budget for the allocation of
resources towards the prevention of natural hazards is lim-
ited. Usually, it is the politicians that ideally decide in the
interest of their voters about how much of the overall budget
should be allocated towards this prevention and the task to
actually distribute this money among the endangered regions
is delegated to an experts’ bureau (who will be referred to
as bureaucrats in the following as already explained above).
The work of the later is economically argued to be a source
of inefﬁciencies resulting in organisational slack and over-
supply of the respective public good. Such problems are re-
ferred to as principal-agent problems. In the case where the
voters are the principal and the politicians the agents, diver-
gences arise between what voters prefer as the optimal allo-
cation and what politicians actually do. For example, natu-
ral catastrophes affecting settlements are per se events that
shed negative lights on the authorities responsible for their
prevention and are thus one reason why their consequences
are enforced to be minimised. Thus, a more lavish approach
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to budget spending could be assumed. On the other hand,
politicians are the ﬁrst ones to emphasise their support after
such an event (Prime Minister Gordon Brown after the recent
ﬂood events in the United Kingdom is just one example) in
order to gain sympathy among their voters. When politicians
take up the role of principals and bureaucrats are the agents,
other problems arise, ﬁrst and foremost the one of asymmet-
ric information. Conﬂicts arise between the bureaucrats who
seek for promotions and for funds in competition with other
bureaus and principals who focus on obtaining votes.
Unlikeearlysociologicalviewpointsofbureaucratsasspe-
cialised administrative functions that follow “purely objec-
tive considerations” (Weber, 1978, p. 975, cited in Gullis
and Jones, 1993, p. 86), they are assumed to act as ra-
tional individuals (homo oeconomicus) that do not exclu-
sively serve the public interests, but even more so their own
(Kirchg¨ assner, 1991). In maximising their individual bene-
ﬁts, it is believed that their direct and indirect income, their
reputation, their fringe beneﬁts, their job safety as well as
their quiet lives are positive sources of utility (Downs, 1967;
Frey and Kirchg¨ assner, 2002, summarise main variables of
respective bureaucracy models). Instead of either maximis-
ing an organisation’s proﬁt (as a manager in the private sector
where personal income is dependent on the ﬁrm’s proﬁt) or
aiming at professional excellence (as a manager of an NGO
who gains beneﬁts from increased power, status and pres-
tige), bureaucrats are not expected to be interested in achiev-
ing output efﬁciently since it is assumed that there are no
personal gains for them behind this goal. Among others, like
e.g. good reputation, a bureaucrat conducts routine work and
will look for an undisturbed work-life thus avoiding conﬂict
with his superiors (Weck-Hannemann, 1982).
First economic models of the behaviour of public bureau-
crats have been developed by Niskanen (1968, 1971, 1975)
whose general assumptions are that bureaucrats seek to max-
imise the budget of their bureau as well as produce larger-
than-optimal output. Other assumptions that e.g. bureaus are
monopoly suppliers of their service or that bureaucrats hold
no personal income share from a possible surplus also need
to be considered when looking at the ﬁrst model of Niskanen
in terms on budget maximisation.
One important re-consideration of Niskanen’s model is
that the assumption about budget- and output-maximising
behaviours of bureaus only partly hold true. Instead, Migu´ e
and B´ elanger (1974) propose that bureaus do not necessarily
seek to maximise output (in any case they argue that bureaus
are always too large and output is not in terms of pareto-
efﬁciency), but rather the discretionary budget available to
them. This budget is one that is neither allocated for pro-
ducing more output nor to enhance their own salaries but
rather an extra budget that allows them to gain in fringe ben-
eﬁts and in scope of deciding according to their own judge-
ment, thuspositivesourcesoftheirownpersonalutility. Both
models assume that agencies are not controlled or have any
restrictions, in the extreme case assuming bureaucracy act-
ing as a Leviathan (Weck-Hannemann, 1982). The scope
of discretion is said to increase the larger the distance be-
tween the principal(s) preferences and those of the agents
(Langbein, 2003). Discretion is furthermore larger the more
general the policy is formulated to the agencies (Epstein and
O’Halloran, 1999). Migu´ e and B´ elanger show that discretion
consequently leads to inefﬁciency not only in the allocation,
but also in the production of agencies (Weck-Hannemann,
1982).
A different strand of literature argues that disagreement
among multiple principals leads to a reduction in agencies’
discretion (e.g. Moe 1990) since more rules and monitor-
ing systems are installed that increase transaction costs and
therefore inefﬁciency. Such a monitoring rule can be ob-
served in the case of hazard zone planning in Austria, where
the bureau may not take the ﬁnal decision on its own, but
rather decides in a commission, where, among others, also
representatives of the principal (ministerial delegates) place
their vote in the ﬁnal decision. Principals are believed to con-
trol agents’ behaviour as long as marginal beneﬁts are not
lower than marginal costs (Breton and Wintrobe, 1975).
The consequences of discretion can either be agents that
deviate in their behaviour from the expectations of their prin-
cipals (Brehm and Gates, 1997). Monitoring, again, and in-
centive systems can reduce scope for agents’ rent seeking.
Furthermore, careful selection of agents can help overcome
this problem (Langbein, 2003).
Langbein (2003) argues that most of these principal-agent
models view preferences of principals as exogenous from
the agent’s viewpoint. Nonetheless, she states, some agents
can inﬂuence the principals preferences thus control their
own agendas. This might especially apply to highly tech-
nical tasks of agencies, such as is the above-mentioned case.
All together, a differentiated analysis needs to be undertaken
when looking at discretion since it can either enhance or de-
crease efﬁciency of a bureau’s work.
2.2 High expertise tasks by bureaucrats
These basic economic models on output, budget and dis-
cretion variables can be further extended to an agency type
that is responsible for high expertise tasks. In such a case,
asymmetric information between bureaucrats (or experts)
and principals can be even larger.
Raschky (2006) goes a step further towards what is of
speciﬁc interest for the present paper and analyses bureaus
that are responsible for Low-Probability-High-Loss events,
e.g. responsible for the implementation of the socially opti-
mal amount of preventive measures against natural hazards.
The author shows that for these bureaus it is characteristic
to have higher inefﬁcient supply than normal bureaus and
that “additional governmental funds and responsibilities for
the agency increase these allocative inefﬁciencies” (p. 14) to
an even larger extent. It is interesting to evaluate why bud-
gets on protective measures against natural hazards are spent
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lavishly and to deduce this behaviour from the outlined mod-
els. However, the present paper tries to evaluate the inﬂuence
of the participatory element in the decision process on the be-
haviour of the bureaucrat.
2.3 Bureaucrats faced with uncertainty
Risk-averse behaviour can be observed in uncertain decision
contexts (e.g. the degree to which natural catastrophes can be
foreseen by experts, i.e. the bureaucrats) in two ways. Above
all, principal’s reasons for delegating risky tasks might lie
in the fact that they avoid being blamed for costs (Moe,
1997) or the negative outcomes of projects (Fiorina, 1982a,
b: shift-the-responsibility-model). As a consequence, princi-
pals will delegate delicate tasks as long as the marginal bene-
ﬁtsfromnotbeingblamedoutweighthemarginalcostsofnot
claiming the credits for successful completion of tasks (Moe,
1997). In an uncertain environment, agents can be hesitant
in fulﬁlling the tasks their principals would want them to un-
dertake. Mueller (2003) cites two examples where bureau-
crats were in the ﬁrst case hesitant to certiﬁcate a new range
of drugs expecting the potential negative effects they might
incur. In another example bureaucrats were reluctant to in-
vest in a city infrastructure project expecting possible criti-
cism for failure. Both cases show a certain risk-averse be-
haviour of bureaucrats. These two cases can be characterised
as high-cost decisions as deﬁned by Kirchg¨ assner (1991),
whereby the effect of these may have directly or indirectly
negative impacts for bureaucratic experts. In many cases,
Kirchg¨ assner (1991) argues, bureaucrats are confronted with
low-cost decisions whose impacts may have no consequence
for their own utility, which means there may not be an in-
centive for them to take decisions in the interest of the pub-
lic, therefore the installation of as many high-cost decision
contexts for bureaucrats is suggested by Kirchg¨ assner (1991)
or at least the introduction of other soft economic incentive
schemes put forward. If risk-aversion is assumed, high-cost
decisions are expected to lead to a thorough consideration of
the decision at hand, thereby taking all possible means (like
e.g. public participation) for avoiding negative consequences
into the account of their decision.
In order to avoid such situations, also ex ante and ex post
control of agencies are suggested in the literature (e.g. Lang-
bein, 2003), whereby the latter could be less desirable since
e.g. consequences would be suffered from a natural catas-
trophe if protection measures failed. Ex ante control is sug-
gested to focus on reducing asymmetric information by en-
acting institutional frameworks that induce positive or nega-
tive incentive mechanisms (Moe, 1997), thus a process ori-
ented approach is suggested.
2.4 Bureaucrats confronted directly with the public
From the considerations above, some explanations or propo-
sitions can be derived for the behaviour of bureaucrats as
agents as well as politicians as principals in uncertain deci-
sion settings in general and for the exemplary case in Austria
in speciﬁc.
The shift-of-responsibility-model of Fiorina (1982a) could
mean that principals, i.e. politicians (representatives from the
responsible ministry), delegate the task of hazard zone map-
ping to bureaucrats (who are technical experts), thus persist-
ing with the possible credits they could claim from this task.
The reason behind this – at the ﬁrst sight seemingly irra-
tional – behaviour could be the risk involved in the task itself,
i.e. the fear of being blamed for damaging consequences of a
catastrophe that has not been sufﬁciently planned for.
From the bureaucrats’ point of view, there is no legal in-
centive of making decisions according to the interests of the
affected parties in hazard zone mapping since they can not
be made liable in the event of a catastrophe based on the
current legal framework in Austria. Other incentives, such
as the decentralised character of their decision responsibility
may however be effective: bureaucrats draft plans for every
municipality requiring one; therefore negative outcomes of
their decisions could lead to direct accusation of these ex-
pert bureaucrats. This in turn could mean a loss in their rep-
utation (which assumed to reduce their utility) and a more
severe consequence, namely a possible shift to different bu-
reaus, maybe involving less prestige or high social costs.
The introduction of public participation in the decision
process of hazard zone planning might, in the light of these
theories, be explained in various ways: ﬁrst of all, princi-
pals (politicians) could seek ex ante control instruments of
their agents’ work. The participatory element could create
an incentive for agents in terms of the barrier to act like
a Leviathan. Secondly, the representation of public pref-
erences in the decisions taken might enhance re-election
chances for principals (as long as credits of these decisions
are granted to them). Thirdly, from the bureaucrats’ view-
point, the incorporation of participatory processes might be
a further shift in responsibility onto the affected parties so
that in the event of a catastrophe not only bureaucrats but
also affected parties can be blamed for the consequences.
Moreover, bureaucrats might face negative consequences
(e.g. shift in positions/bureaus) of their decisions. Therefore,
they could be assumed to try to make as sound as possible
decisions incorporating all the knowledge they can gather
on top of their own expertise. Furthermore, they could try
to work in line with the preferences of their principals (for
whom participation might be a re-election enhancing instru-
ment) because they are the ones who have power over their
positions. Finally, according to the quiet-life proposition
from above, bureaucrats could adhere to participation ele-
ments to gain acceptance for their jobs, thus have as little
resistance as possible.
Let us now turn to the exemplary case and look at the
framework of decision making in order to understand the
possible consequences for public participation in practice.
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3 A political economic analysis of the relevant actors in
the process of hazard zone planning
3.1 General characteristics of hazard zone planning in Aus-
tria
Competences for typical natural hazards occurring in Aus-
tria are split amongst two national expert units, ﬁrst and
foremost because of ﬁnancial reasons. These competences
are regulated in Austria’s private law (regulation on the haz-
ard zone planning directive GZP-VO BGBI. Nr. 436/1976)
as well as its forestry (§11, art. 1–8) and water construc-
tion and support law (Wasserbautenf¨ orderungsgesetz, 1985).
All planning and protection issues concerning large ﬂowing
waters lie in the responsibility of Austria’s Bundeswasser-
bauverwaltung (i.e. the water constructions authority). All
large rivers, their retention and settlement areas, as well fu-
ture planning around them are observed by this authority. All
other risks stemming from nature, like mudslides, landslides,
avalanches, torrents as well as rock falls or debris ﬂows, be-
long to the competence of the WLV – Austrian service for
torrent and avalanche control (i.e. the construction authority
of protection measures against torrents and avalanches). The
exact deﬁnition of the terms wide ﬂowing waters and tor-
rents is regulated in the danger zone directive (e.g. law on
forestry, 1975, §99, art. 1–5). In line with this general divi-
sion of competences goes the responsibility for hazard zone
planning. Both authorities map their respective hazards sep-
arately from one another. In general, this is an acceptable
procedure since oftentimes the effects are different amongst
these two hazards. For example, if it rains over a longer pe-
riod of time over a large area, then typically this increases the
ﬂood potential of large water ﬂows. On the other hand, short
and intensive rainfalls in one speciﬁc area usually increase
the likelihood of torrents causing mud- or landslides.
In this paper we are only concerned with the sphere of
competenceoftheWLV,theservicefortorrentandavalanche
control, however potential conﬂicts between this authority
and the one responsible for large ﬂowing waters, the Bun-
deswasserbauverwaltung, poses some difﬁculties to the work
of both (e.g. trouble spots arise on the frontiers between the
two competence spheres that could possible cause for catas-
trophic outcomes after natural hazard events).
Returning to the authority for torrents and avalanches (in
short WLV), one important characteristic is their direct sub-
ordination to the Ministry of the Environment or its sub-
section, the Ministry of land and forestry economy. The
WLV is divided into a national authority, sections in each
of Austria’s federal states that are again, according to the
size of this state, divided into regional ofﬁces. Apart from
danger zone planning, each of the sections is also responsi-
ble for the planning and installation of protection measures
against the above-mentioned hazards and the maintenance of
these. Finally, they are the experts who have to be surveyors
for speciﬁc issues of torrent and avalanche protections in pri-
vate cases (see law on forestry, 1975, §102, art. 5, paragraphs
a–g).
Hazard Zone Planning plays two key roles, especially in
a country like Austria, where settlement areas have become
more and more scarce and natural hazards are given in the
more levied areas and the Alpine landscapes as well in the
plane surfaces, where large ﬂowing waters coin the environ-
ment: ontheonehanditindicatesdifferentsourcesandlevels
of risk for currently spatially relevant areas. Whereas mas-
sive reconstruction work was on the priority list above all af-
ter the Second World War, hazard zone planning has only be-
come apparent since the 1970’s. Not considering potentially
hazardous areas, many settlements, e.g. buildings and other
infrastructures had been built in areas exposed to avalanches,
mudslides, ﬂooding etc. Obviously, it would be politically
unpopular to impose private as well as organisational own-
ers of buildings the installation of protection measures for
houses or infrastructures in retrospect. Protection measures
are therefore installed on the basis of suggestion by bureau-
cratic experts through public funds based on a priority list.
Historically, it is in dispute whether people avoided settling
in endangered areas or whether they just lived being aware of
the hazards and thus accepting the consequences of damages
every now and then. Huber (WLV, Imst, personal communi-
cation, 2006) argues that people in Tyrol only began to settle
close to the river Inn when protection measures were built.
Apart from the ﬁrst full assessment of hazardous areas cur-
rently going on, hazard zone planning is an important basis
for future spatial planning as well, so that new areas are only
released for development projects in less hazardous zones,
or alternatively released conditioned upon the instalment of
private protection measures.
Austria’s ﬁrst hazard zone maps had been developed in
the 1970’s after the introduction of the legal requirement for
them in the 1975’s law on forestry. Most of the municipali-
ties requiring such plans have already got one (in Tyrol 229
out of 272 and in Vorarlberg all of the 87; BMLFUW, 2006),
however not all of these plans have been revised after their
development in the 1970’s and 1980’s and therefore have a
big backlog in terms of ongoing development and creation
of protection measures during this period. Being aware of
the increasing risk potential due to increased development in
endangered areas and especially after the deadly avalanche
catastrophe event in the Tyrolean municipality of Galt¨ ur in
1999 (where about 40 persons got killed), the Tyrolean law
on land use planning, especially also its regulations from
1993 foresees the goal to revise all plans until the end of
the year 2010. According to the responsible section of Tyrol,
one expert can handle at most 2 hazard zone maps a year;
Tyrol has about 72 and Vorarlberg about 39 ﬁxed contract
personnel (administration and experts).
The political pressure of judging the risk of natural haz-
ards as accurately as possible can be observed in how adap-
tations to current zoning criteria like e.g. the avalanche risk
measured in terms of snow pressure of 2.5tons had been
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decreased to 1ton after the catastrophic avalanche event in
Galt¨ ur, which means an increase in the red zone area. Appar-
ently the uncertainty about where to ﬁx risk levels from the
expert side is considerable and adaptations reduce the risk of
experts being blamed for the damages of a future event.
In general it can be said (Huber, WLV Imst, personal com-
munication, 2006) that affected parties usually raise concerns
over draft plans only if their personal properties are affected.
The scarcer the settling area is, the greater is the interest of
the affected parties or the private property owners in haz-
ard zoning because the number of affected parties by yel-
low and red zones is likely to increase. As a consequence,
a strong participating behaviour can be observed in the Aus-
trian regions of Tyrol and Vorarlberg that are left with only
few empty spaces to settle and surrounded by diverse natural
hazards due to the natural landscape of mountains.
3.2 An analysis of the relevant actors in the decision pro-
cess
It is important to describe the role of each of the actors in or-
der to understand their support or rejection for participatory
elements in the planning process. This understanding is cru-
cial for the successful integration of participatory elements
in decisions. Here, a comprehensive overview of all actors
that are affected by or can affect the decision process shall
be given.
The relevant actors in the process of hazard zone planning
can be grouped as follows:
1. politicians (principals)
2. agents (bureaucrats, i.e. experts – WLV)
3. the WLV commission (consisting of the WLV drafter,
the regional WLV unit director, a municipality repre-
sentative, a ministry delegate, another expert from the
federal government (optional))
4. voters (i.e. taxpayers; directly and indirectly affected
parties of hazard zone maps)
5. interest groups (e.g. tourism industry)
3.2.1 Politicians (principals)
Already noted above, politicians are the ones who decide
upon the amount of resources dedicated to the prevention of
natural hazards and respective preventive measures (e.g. haz-
ard zone maps). Again, deriving from the theories above,
politicians seek to optimise their chances to stay in ofﬁce.
On the one hand they will enforce this by avoiding to be
blamed for negative consequences of catastrophic events, on
the other hand they will try to claim credits from good work
of bureaucrats responsible for natural hazard prevention. On
top of this, they also seek to gain in popularity by being
overly present in case of catastrophes to show their function
as the “helping hand” beneﬁting from broad media cover-
age usually present at such times. This behaviour is further-
more enhanced the closer the election is to the catastrophic
event (popularity function models show this sort of voting
behaviour, e.g. in Mueller, 2003, whereby the myopic voter
is the most extreme in that he or she votes considering the
economic performance of the government shortly before the
elections). As a consequence, the amount of resources ded-
icated to natural hazards increases considerably after catas-
trophic events. The proportion of resources allocated to areas
that are in the media’s headlines is even higher, whereby con-
sequently lesser is dedicated to areas higher on the original
priority list of the experts (Theisen, 1997). From a political
economic viewpoint, the attention to areas hit by a catastro-
phe is also likely to increase, the more the area is relevant
for upcoming elections or re-elections. The closer the re-
sults of previous elections were, the likelier it is for politi-
cians that their efforts (e.g. campaigning, allocating addi-
tional government funds) turn into an electoral success (Frey,
1978; Mueller, 2003). On top of close election results, it is
also presumed that politicians’ efforts are more likely to be
rewarded the more critical (pivotal) voters are in an electoral
district (Hirschmann, 1964).
Apart from these incentives, politicians exercise power in
terms of legislation they can enact over the bureaus’ work. In
terms of the participatory (legally prescribed) element in the
decision process, politicians might seek some ex ante control
on the one hand, and on the other some form of increasing
the representation of preferences of their voters in the ﬁnal
decision outcome.
3.2.2 Experts (i.e. bureaucrats (agents))
Bureaucrats (i.e. WLV experts) are confronted with two main
tasks: on the one hand they have to develop hazard zone
maps and on the other they need to install protection mea-
sures. The ﬁrst task is usually the one that is less attractive
to agents since it puts themselves in an unpopular situation
amongst the public. This often lies in the enforcement of
stricter hazard zones (i.e. enlarging hazardous ones) which
consequently leads to devaluation of properties and lands.
The second task is far more attractive to agents since it pro-
vides them with a very powerful position in allocating their
budgets towards preventive measures whereby people regard
them as a welcome support for their living needs, therefore
the acceptance is higher. In order to impede this incentive
to overdue the later task, the ministry of the environment
has given out the directive that prescribes the development
of hazard zone maps before any new preventive measure can
be installed. The allocation decision for protection measures
needs to be based on a priority setting scheme developed by
the WLV. In cases of measures costing more than 1 million
Euros, a cost-beneﬁt analysis needs to be conducted (Rudolf-
Miklau, 2005). This objectiﬁcation attempt can nonetheless
not always be pursued since political pressure (e.g. after the
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avalanche catastrophe in Galt¨ ur 1999) forces the WLV to re-
allocatebudgetstowardsotherareas, whereanabove-average
protection level is consequently achieved.
Intermsofparticipation, detailedbehaviouralassumptions
have been outlined in the models in Sect. 5.2 and will be re-
assessed in the operationalisation of the propositions and the
empirical study below.
3.2.3 The WLV commission
The hazard zone map has, after its public display, to be ap-
proved by a commission which is usually composed of one
ministerial delegate, the regional planner as well as the re-
gional head of section and one representative of the munic-
ipality for which the plan has been designed (usually this is
the mayor). Besides these, sometimes other experts form part
of the commission (e.g. the federal geologist in Vorarlberg).
The involvement of local governmental representatives is of-
ten viewed as problematic by the experts since he will nat-
urally have other criteria (re-election constraint) to consider
when giving his vote apart from the mere technical facts. In
many incidents that can be found in the protocols, where the
commission had to re-discuss the originally developed plans
due to objections of affected parties, the mayor is the only
person opposing a decision (if the objections can not be sus-
tained). In the view of the bureaucrats this poses big damp
to the thorough conduct of their work. Bednarz (WLV, Inns-
bruck, personalcommunication, 2005)mentionsthatinsome
Austrian federal states also other government experts partic-
ipate in the commission, e.g. the federal state geologist in
Vorarlberg or the forestry responsible in Salzburg or the spa-
tial planner in Tyrol, which poses another impediment to the
work of the bureaucrats in his eyes. In effect, this view could
be explained in that they have to give away decisive power.
The commission is the one who has to decide collectively
on the inclusion of appeals in the re-drafting of the plan and
the ﬁnal decision on it. As explained above, the mayor might
have a vested interest in supporting these appeals for his own
utility (capture theory). Bureaucrats (i.e. the planner) are
however the ones who have a strong inﬂuence on the actual
integration of appeals received through the participatory pro-
cess. Their views on whether appeals are legitimate have a
strong impact on the draft plan. In a nutshell, bureaucrats’ in-
centives to incorporate these participatory outcomes are the
reputation of their positions and possible consequences faced
when damages after a natural catastrophe could have been
avoided. Furthermore, principals might want to incorporate
voters’preferencesinordersotoenhancetheirchancetostay
in ofﬁce for the next electoral period.
3.2.4 Voters
Voters ﬁnance prevention measures against natural catastro-
phes through their taxes. The majority of prevention mea-
sures is funded by state’s funds, whereby also a consider-
able share (usually around 40%) has to be contributed from
the municipality directly beneﬁting from them. As a conse-
quence, the bearers of the costs should be among the ones
to have a signiﬁcant say in terms of where, when and how
much should be allocated for this purpose. In effect, this
task is delegated to politicians and they again delegate it to
their bureaus through constitutional rules. From a theoret-
ical viewpoint, it can be assumed that discrepancy between
voters’ actual preferences and the tasks carried out by the bu-
reaus can occur. This is even more the case, the more bureau-
crats have incentives to follow their own interests and the less
affected parties can take part in the decision process. Legally
prescribed participation could possibly help narrowing this
gap by directly reﬂecting preferences in speciﬁc cases. As
already outlined, preferences in the underlying case can be
brought in by anyone who can declare a vested interest. In
effect, this would entitle every taxpayer to bring in appeals,
but in reality, only affected parties make use of this instru-
ment. So the question is what their incentives are to actually
participate.
First of all, they want to avoid negative impacts on their
utility from hazard zone maps (e.g. devaluation of their prop-
erties), hence they might plea for extending hazardous zones
expecting future protection measures being installed (thus re-
gaining economic values) or otherwise state against the ex-
tensionofsuchzones. Allthisassumesthatpeoplewhobring
in appeals expect to have some impact on the ﬁnal decision
process or otherwise expect some gain in procedural utility
of the decision process.
3.2.5 Interest groups
Besides voters in general, there are several groups of voters
that together have a vested interest, besides them as individ-
ual tax payers. Among them are for example the tourism
industry (e.g. hotel owners, lift operators etc.), environmen-
talists, the construction industry or farmers. As a group, they
might come together to enhance their lobbying power and
thus their rent-seeking beneﬁts.
Overall, a high complexity for the decision context is
formed by this multiplicity of interests in the ﬁnal outcome.
Theoretically however, from all actors’ viewpoints, there
seems to be incentives to take participation into their deci-
sion accounts.
The factor that could neglect the signiﬁcance of the in-
tegration of public participation is the involved transaction
costs, for example stemming from the divergence of prefer-
ences of the public and the expert. Hence, the question is:
Do experts’ judgements actually stand opposite the input lay
people can provide in a seemingly high-expertise task?
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4 Experts’ versus lay people’s judgements
Based on constitutional economic assumptions, individual
preferences should be represented in the decision process
in order to achieve efﬁcient outcomes. Dealing with de-
cisions that are coupled with a high degree of uncertainty
(e.g. predictions of natural hazards and protection measures
for their prevention), lay people’s (or voters’, i.e. affected
parties)judgementisoftendeemedtobesubjecttoanomalies
(Kahnemann et al., 1982; Nisbett and Ross, 1980, or Eichen-
berger, 1992), where the assumptions of a rational choice in-
dividual do not hold anymore (rather than that they are de-
pendent on the institutional framework, the scope for per-
ception and the amount of information they can gather; van
Aaken, 2006). Especially for small probabilities of uncer-
tain events and the risk of loss, the individual choice poses
problems since such events and risks are systematically be-
ing neglected (Eichenberger, 1992). Arising anomalies in
the choice behaviour of individuals could lead to a cut in
decision freedom through paternalistic legal norms, since it
is believed that anomalies could impose costs to individu-
als as well as the collective (van Aaken, 2006). Such pa-
ternalistic decision-making could imply shifting the decision
to objective expert judgement without the individual prefer-
ences taken into account (whereby the process efﬁciency cri-
terion could be left unfulﬁlled). However, many studies have
shown that voters’ information basis, especially concerning
topics that affect them immediately (like e.g. natural haz-
ards in their own municipalities), has been underestimated
(e.g. Wittmann, 1989). On the contrary, it can be argued, that
experts, againstthewidebelievethattheycangiveamoreob-
jectiveviewforsuchdecisionstructures, equallyfaceanoma-
lies in their judgements (Eichenberger, 1992). Assuming
that these anomalies among individuals exist there are two
possible ways for resolution: Installing a paternalistic deci-
sion rule is acceptable for situations where affected parties
themselves decide on such a decision rule, thus assuming
their own anomalies leading to disadvantageous outcomes
(Eichenberger, 1992). Van Aaken (2006) suggests keeping
up integrating individual preferences in a direct way via a
communication process (with the affected parties) that could
reduce their anomalies and consequently could lead to ratio-
nal choices. The present study’s legal prescription of alterna-
tive participatory elements can therefore be interpreted in the
light of this proposition, whereby the two sides of the com-
munication channel (expert bureaucrats and affected parties)
could decrease their choice anomalies by engaging in an ex-
changing communication process.
5 Conclusions
The initial proposition of the present paper was that public
participation in high expertise decisions that involve a con-
siderable degree of uncertainty could be beneﬁcial; both for
experts, to gain in acceptance and divide the share of respon-
sibility for the consequences of unforeseen events, and the
public, for integrating their local knowledge about natural
hazards as well as preferences in the decision process. The
barriers to such a decision process in practice were shown
to be manifold: bureaucrats have no legal incentive to incor-
porate such an element and lay people might be reluctant to
participate expecting their contribution to be unheard. It has
been shown that the argument that lay people face anomalies
in their decision judgement is also applicable to experts and
furthermore can be reduced through a thorough information
process ahead of the decision. A rigid analysis of the inter-
ests involved in such a decision process, as in the hazard zone
planning case shown in this article, can provide the necessary
knowledge for setting the legal decision framework for suc-
cessful incorporation of such participative elements. The en-
forcement of the decision in a paternalistic manner through
expert decision responsibility can be however acceptable as
long as affected parties agree upon such a decision rule.
The theoretical foundations allow us to conclude that
public participation can indeed offer a ground to more
efﬁcient decisions in uncertain contexts such as the man-
agement of natural hazards is. However following this; it
will be necessary in future studies to test this proposition
empirically to see ﬁrst of all whether such participative
elements are adopted by the public and if so, if it is only
decorative to ﬁnal decision makers (i.e. experts) or actually
taken seriously into their decision considerations. This
allows providing the necessary framework for installing such
decision mechanisms legally to reinforce the democratic
instruments already in place.
Edited by: S. Fuchs, M. Br¨ undl, R. Bernknopf, and T. Glade
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